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RESUMO – O artigo propõe um diálogo entre 
William James e Friedrich Nietzsche acerca da 
natureza da doença e sua superação ou conva-
lescença. À primeira vista, seria uma tolice 
reconciliar o renascimento religioso com a conva-
lescença que levou Nietzsche à “grande saúde.” 
A fim de tentar ir além desta insensatez, conside-
raremos cuidadosamente o locus onde a saúde 
emerge para ambos pensadores. A discussão é 
motivada, ademais, por um interesse no destino
da religião após a morte de Deus. 
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  ABSTRACT – The essay seeks to bring William 
James into dialogue with Friedrich Nietzsche
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overcoming or convalescence. It is, at first
glance, folly to reconcile religious rebirth with the
convalescence that led Nietzsche to the “great
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for religion after the death of God. 
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For my friend, Dawn Cho 
1   Sick of it all 
In his profound study of religion, The Varieties of Religious Experience 
(1902), William James distinguishes two antinomian types of human experi-
ence: healthy-mindedness and the sick soul. The former demanded a habitual 
and disciplined denial of evil, abjection, and horror in favor of a uniformly posi-
tive disposition towards life. One becomes “feelingless to evil” and in “these 
states, the ordinary contrast of good and ill seems to be swallowed up in a 
higher denomination, an omnipotent excitement which engulfs the evil, and 
which the human being welcomes as the crowning experience of his life.”
1 
The enthusiastic disposition that feels that everything is good, that, in a sense, 
there is only good, has been the ambition of much of the American talking 
cure, therapeutic optimism, and even indicated a fundamental mood of at-
tunement, according to James, for someone like Walt Whitman. Depression, 
sadness, self-destructive rages in the pit of nihilism, and wilting despairs are 
signs of a bad attitude and an immature and feckless perspective. As soon as 
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one thinks more positively about the world, the world somehow cooperates 
and appears more positive. Perhaps for the greatest practitioners of this over-
flowing positivity, the world is revealed to have been all along without evil and 
ugliness. Walt Whitman’s majestic affirmation is, however, the exception that 
reminds us of the norm: that most all positive thinkers, like most all people, 
eventually hit a wall, namely, an experience of the abject that contests assimi-
lation, that shatters the prophylactic of their healthy-mindedness. “But it 
breaks down impotently as soon as melancholy comes; and even though one 
be quite free from melancholy one’s self, there is no doubt that healthy-
mindedness is inadequate as a philosophical doctrine, because the evil facts 
which it refuses positively to account for are a genuine portion of reality” (VR, 
182). 
In a sense, from a more contemporary perspective, one can now more 
clearly discern that the movement that begin with American popular culture’s 
incessant auto suggestion that everything is great, that positive thinking 
makes one more powerful by rendering illusory human life’s unappetizing 
aspects, will culminate in a culture whose leader flaunts his “optimism” as if it 
were a sufficient condition to change the world and whose population trends 
towards self-medication as a condition for a properly functional and cheery 
life. Megalomaniacal optimism and the Prozac nation share the same root: the 
conflation of health with the inflation of idealism. By the latter I mean that the 
problem of health is understood to be in some fundamental sense an out-
growth, a symptom, of the quality of one’s subjectivity. If the subject succeeds 
in believing her or his own dramatic declaration of optimism and by means of 
a willful fallacy of collection decides that the good parts of life speak to and for 
the whole of life, then the evaluative mode ceases to distinguish anything. 
One becomes insensate to sickness and evil, which evaporate into the bright 
day where everything is blindingly good. 
But “living simply in the light of the good is splendid as long as it will 
work” (VR, 182). Should the blinding light fail to protect one from the experi-
ences that rebel against the mood of omnibenevolence, then one must render 
the subject even more insensate. When autocratic moods and beliefs are not 
enough, when the mind cure no longer repels the barbarian forces of sickness, 
and optimism “breaks down impotently as soon as melancholy comes” (VR, 
182), one must further blunt one’s sensitivity, becoming “happier and health-
ier,” with pain medication, non-prescribed narcotics, or massive, almost sub-
lime, levels of denial. One medicates the pain that dis-eases the failing opti-
mist, allowing life once again to appear palatable and “healthy.” Mother’s 
“little helper” (valium or whatever else is fashionable) succors mother’s erupt-
ing despair by artificially elevating her subjective standpoint. 
Former President George W. Bush, who, among many other debacles, 
some of which have not yet come to light, presided over a worldwide financial 
crisis, two failed wars, one of which was illegal and promoted on maliciously 
deceptive intelligence, the further destabilization of the Middle East, the ero-  103
sion of the American justice system, the use of torture and extraordinary ren-
dition, a stunning culture of corruption and cronyism, and immense environ-
mental degradation, had a rug in front of his desk announcing that an optimis-
tic person works here. He was fond of talking about this rug. Recounting how 
presidents are at some liberty to design parts of the Oval Office, Bush fondly 
recalled that, “The interesting thing about this rug and why I like it in here is 
‘cause I told Laura one thing. I said, ‘Look, I can't pick the colors and all that. 
But make it say ‘optimistic person’.”
2 No matter how bad things were going, 
in New Orleans, in Baghdad, in the Justice Department, excessive emphasis 
on them was a symptom of pessimism, which presumably indicated weak-
ness, an inability to lead. Pessimism was itself the malady, not the events that 
were making one pessimistic. Bush: the imperium of the once-born, and in this 
sense the sickness of a certain conception of health. 
The implication is clear: the “once-born,” that is, those who can affirm the 
whole of life naturally, are either exceedingly rare, natural born sages that 
humble us with their equanimity, or, as is usually the case, are hucksters, the 
desperate, global marketers who hide their crimes under the veneer of a chip-
per attitude, citizens of the New Age, and other dreamers, all of whom are 
likely headed for a rude awakening. Optimism is in this respect nascent sick-
ness, waiting for the clarity of the dark night to flush it out. 
The “twice-born” on the other hand emerge from the dark depths of life 
with an increased capacity to affirm the whole of experience. Religious experi-
ence increases one’s capacity for life, but it does not do so through therapeu-
tically playing the bait and switch of either medical idealism (the decision to 
see life as what it is not) or medical materialism (just medicate the brain into 
pleasure states). Or to put it more succinctly, religious experience, as opposed 
to the institutional forms of religion, is not something that I experience, but 
rather an experience that alters one’s very sense of self, that suggests that the 
search for health in the narcissistic field of egoism is itself a symptom of the 
most pernicious and delusional kind of sickness: one that drives one to “cures” 
that appear as such because of the nature of the sickness. This sickness drives 
one to “cures” that are sometimes worse than the original sickness and in the 
best case scenario merely distract one from any clarity regarding the nature of 
one’s sickness. 
James famously defined religion as the “feelings, acts, and experiences of 
individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand 
in relation to whatever they may consider the divine” (VR, 36). The religion 
being analyzed is the experience of religion and not therefore the collective 
behavior of shared rituals, common dogmas, and mass movements. (James is 
still criticized by theologians and others for attempting to dispense with scrip-
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ture, theology, and church tradition as starting points.) Nor is religion a merely 
personal matter, as if the subject were merely and perhaps mysteriously fol-
lowing individual preferences and more generally confusing their fancies with 
an experience of supreme value. Religion is first and foremost experienced in 
solitude (not in institutions, rituals, and collective movements) and in some 
way is even the experience of solitude itself. The latter should not be confused 
with a state of abandoned and forlorn individualism.
3 The individual, when 
abandoned by others, or isolated by a repressive government, is left to them-
selves, and knows loneliness. 
Hannah Arendt later and powerfully distinguished loneliness, the bane of 
life in totalitarian states, from solitude: in the latter, “I am ‘by myself,’ together 
with myself, and therefore two-in-one, whereas in loneliness I am actually 
one, deserted by all others.”
4 When, starving, I ask for food, it is as if I am 
speaking a language that no one understands. This is an example of the im-
mense loneliness of contemporary global culture. Solitude, on the other hand, 
is always plural, in so far as I am not one, even to myself. This is not to say 
that every time I walk down a country path contemplating my past mistakes 
that I am necessarily having an experience of religious solitude. The latter is a 
deepening and radicalizing of solitude. Individualism, on the other hand, is the 
permanent risk of loneliness, or perhaps one might even infer that the loneli-
ness and the quiet sadness of self-interested individuals who come together 
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with others simply because they share something of interest in common is a 
symptom of the sick soul who finds her or himself fundamentally forsaken. 
Perhaps in solitude one still knows something of the sadness of things, 
but in loneliness, in being forsaken and abandoned to individuality, optimism 
is the mere postponement of melancholy. As Tolstoy lamented, “Why should I 
live? Why should I do anything? Is there in life any purpose which the inevita-
ble death which awaits me does not undo and destroy? (VR, 173). Tolstoy’s 
depression already articulated the nihilistic despair, the sense that one has 
been forsaken by life, abandoned to the loneliness and absurdity that death at 
first seems to promise. For Tolstoy, at least in the stage of the loneliness of 
being forsaken to the “meaningless absurdity of life” (VR, 174) this was akin to 
what Nietzsche diagnosed as the sickness of modernity: the reactive nihilism 
of das Umsonst! – of the sense that human striving is an exercise in futility. 
What was the death of God for Nietzsche if not the immense and aggressive 
loneliness of modernity? For Tolstoy, “it was like a feeling of dread that made 
me seem like an orphan and isolated in the midst of all these things that were 
so foreign” (VR, 174). This for James indicated “the core of the religious prob-
lem: Help! help!” (VR, 181). We have been forsaken! We are alone. When 
James recovered from his own severe bout of depression, one can wonder if 
this was an awakening from forlorn “individualism” to solitude. When James 
insists that he is a “rabid individualist,”
5 he is defending a specific kind of 
individualism, far from the rugged individualism of the capitalist consumers 
and corporate climbers, who are always in it for themselves, so to speak. He 
was defending the solitude of individualism, the solitude of the conversion of 
the forsaken self away from its obsession with itself and towards the radically 
other. 
Into this forlorn sickness of the soul, solitude speaks to “a second birth, a 
deeper kind of conscious being” than one “could enjoy before” (VR, 175). For 
in this experience of solitude I am not only related to others, per haps even to 
all beings, but more fundamentally I find myself standing in relation to the 
divine, to a two-in-one that takes me beyond myself. In the second birth, the 
“regenerative change” (VR, 560) of the sick soul, the forsaken ones are taken 
beyond themselves, drawn to a non sequitur that could never have been de-
rived from their affliction. “So long as the egoistic worry of the sick soul 
guards the door, the expansive confidence of the soul of faith gains no pres-
ence. But let the former faint away, even for a moment, and the latter can 
profit by the opportunity, and, having once acquired possession, may retain it” 
(VR, 235). 
It is as if the sick soul experienced Arjuna’s melancholic delirium in the 
Bhagavad-Gita, a text already known in the West by this time. Arjuna is un-
able to act, to get up and blow the conch shell. Krishna breaks through, draw-
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ing Arjuna away from himself, back to the life that he had long ago lost when 
he imagined that he was in charge of his life, standing in front of it, posed 
before it. The Gita calls this ahamkara, the illusion that “I act.” In James’ ac-
count of the second birth, or in the Gita’s account of Arjuna’s reclamation of 
his dharma, religion, to be related to that which is otherwise than oneself, is 
the experience of solitude, of a conversion to the non-sequitur of what is 
wholly otherwise. 
Nonetheless, James’ circumscription does not eschew all talk of individu-
ality. One stands in relation to “whatever they may consider the divine,” 
which risks sounding like the claim that religion originates in the sphere of 
subjectivity. What is religion to me? Indeed, James later confesses that to 
some extent religion is “essentially private and individualistic; it always ex-
ceeds our powers of formulation” (VR, 469). This is not to say, however, that 
in the end James collapses back into the lonely egoism of personal religious 
preferences. Here the language of individualism speaks to the depth of experi-
ence itself. It is not that the religious object is determined to have originated 
within the sphere of subjectivity, but rather that it takes the subject beyond 
her or himself in such a way that they can no longer speak precisely and uni-
versally to the nature of the experience that shattered the very frame of con-
sciousness that characterized the sick soul. “Feeling is private and dumb, and 
unable to give an account of itself” (VR, 471). Individual religious experience 
here is much closer to Kierkegaard’s knight of faith and the teleological sus-
pension of the universality that comprises the ethical.
6 
And hence for James mystical experience, of interest to those who are al-
ready so inclined, has no power to demand assent outside of the solitude in 
which it was born, for “mystics have no right to claim that we ought to accept 
the deliverance of their peculiar experiences, if we are ourselves outsiders and 
feel no private call thereto” (VR, 462). There is no unanimity in the description 
of mystical experience, nor is there any way in which to evaluate good ec-
static experiences from diabolical ones, and, finally, such experiences do not 
readily yield the privacy of their solitude to the public life of reason and phi-
losophical accounting. In this sense, the experience of religious solitude, to 
anticipate our discussion of Nietzsche, is for everyone and no one. 
Yet this is in a sense a way of understanding the challenge that always 
confronts philosophy, namely to “redeem religion from unwholesome privacy” 
(VR, 471) and find the language to communicate this solitude, without collaps-
ing in “an absolutely worthless invention of the scholarly mind” (VR, 487) like 
the excesses of Scholasticism. This may in some ways be an “absolutely hope-
less {VR, 496) task, for, quite simply, “there is always a plus, a thisness, which 
feeling alone can answer for” (VR, 495). This surplus which disrupts the sick 
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soul, this electric shock of the plus that draws one back to a life that enchants 
us from its abeyance, is the return, the rebirth, of health, and health itself does 
not deliver itself to the alleged security of universals and other false, albeit 
institutionally enshrined, gods. What is it to us that the sick soul is well again? 
It is the gift of solitude, and therefore the gift of health, sundered from the 
medical gaze and its bag of “healthy” functions and indicators. In this sense, 
health is an art, not a medical science – an art born of the experience of soli-
tude. 
In this sense, as scandalous as it may first sound, there is a touch of 
Bataille’s radical religiosity in James, for the former claimed that religion was 
erotic and “eroticism is silence . . . it is solitude. But not to the people whose 
very presence in the world is a pure negation of silence, idle chatter, a forget-
fulness of the possibility of solitude.”
7 And in writing about Nietzsche’s tonic 
of solitude, Bataille once asked, “Is there a silence more stifling, more sound-
proof, further beneath the earth?”
8 
2   Dangerously healthy 
Perhaps a hasty reading of Nietzsche would locate him among the myste-
riously healthy-minded, those so naturally beyond good and evil that they are 
beyond evaluation as such. Nietzsche would simply be that aberrant product 
of nature that readily and enthusiastically celebrates life in toto, and we would 
enviously stand on the sidelines, wishing for such a miracle in our own lives. I 
think that this would not only be a misguided reading, but it would be a 
symptom of the very sickness that Nietzsche diagnosed. 
 In the second aphorism of the second (1887) edition of The Gay Science, 
Nietzsche asks pointedly, “What is it to us that Herr Nietzsche has again be-
come healthy?”
9 Herr Nietzsche has convalesced and this, he claims, is of vital 
importance for us all. But what was this sickness and what is this health, and 
how does it speak to us, perhaps to those who first know themselves as us in 
terms of some collective individuality? 
In a letter to his mother, Nietzsche, with his failing digestive system, 
chronic headaches and nausea, increasing blindness, and impending madness, 
claimed that he was the only healthy person in Europe. Indeed, the first apho-
rism of The Gay Science announces an effusive gratitude for an unexpected 
convalescence [Genesung] and indeed speaks of the Trunkenheit der Gene-
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sung, the drunkenness of convalescence (KSA 3, 345). How are we to think a 
drunken recovery that has nothing in common with the desperate drinking 
that comprises our quotidian benders? Towards the end of the Gay Science, 
Nietzsche speaks of this rebirth as the Great Health [die große Gesundheit]. It 
was the symptom of “the new ones, the nameless ones”: 
And now, after we have long been on our way in this manner, we Argonauts of 
the ideal, with more daring perhaps than is prudent, and have suffered shipwreck 
and damage often enough, but we are, healthier than one likes to permit us, dan-
gerously healthy, ever again healthy. (KSA 3, 636). 
Before the convalescence, Nietzsche had been exclusively sick. He had 
never in any way been healthy, and hence it would have been false to assume 
that his former sickness was a deviation from an allegedly normal state of 
health. He had to convalesce from a sickness that had never tasted health. 
Now Nietzsche, who, with his pain ridden body and looming insanity would 
never have been deemed healthy by the medical gaze, was healthy even in his 
sickness. His health was not the absence of sickness but rather a health be-
yond the duality of health and sickness, a great health, a kind of Übergesund-
heit, a trans-healthiness that governs the manner in which one is sick and 
healthy. Such a health is not found. It is not the result of jogging and tofu. It is 
unleashed. “This art of transfiguration is precisely philosophy” (KSA 3, 349). 
Thinking itself has been reborn, dares to affirm, after many centuries of sick-
ness, a great health. This health has nothing to do with arriving at some cul-
minating end state of being, in which the thinker and philosophy themselves 
get to be all they can be. One is always ever again healthy, on the way to the 
overflow of life that is the eternal return of the great health. In this sense, the 
Great Health is also an increase–even a maximization–of the capacity for life. 
3   Philosophy as Heilmittel 
Perhaps one might still protest that bringing Nietzsche into dialogue with 
James seems inessential, perhaps eccentric. Certainly Nietzsche was no friend 
of the herd mentality (“Platonism for the people”) that congeals into religious 
fervor, famously arguing: 
From the beginning there is something unhealthy in such priestly aristocracies 
and in the habits ruling there . . . Habits that have as a consequence the intestinal 
disease and neurasthenia that almost unavoidably clings to the priests of all ages; 
but what they themselves invented as a medicine [Heilmittel] against this dis-
easedness of theirs–must we not say that in the end that it has proved itself a 
hundred times more dangerous in its aftereffects than the disease from which it 
was to redeem them? (KSA 5, 265/GM, 15) 
The practice of religion involves running to a medicine–the promise of re-
ligious salvation–that in its very appearance as a Heilmittel indicates a) just 
how sick one really must have been for such a thing ever to have appeared   109
either holy or healing; and b) that the diseases will further rage, albeit invisi-
bly, as one runs towards sickness as if it were health. The more one tries to 
cure oneself, the sicker one becomes. Finally, disdaining all healthy air as if it 
bore pestilence, the sick soul gets right with God, and becomes virtuous: 
The diseased softening and moralization by virtue of which the creature ‘human’ 
finally learns to be ashamed of all of his instincts. Along the way to ‘angel’ . . . the 
human has bred for themselves that upset stomach and coated tongue through 
which not only have the joy and the innocence of the animal become repulsive 
but life itself has become unsavory” (KSA 5, 302-303/GM, 43).
10 
James for his part refers to Nietzsche’s critique of the saintly as “sickly 
enough” (VR, 407), but asking great thinkers to understand each other in order 
to remain great thinkers is symptom of the sick soul. For both, the health, the 
great health of solitude, involves the radical conversion to the plus that turns 
one away from oneself and towards the healing holiness of life, a turning that 
Nietzsche himself called das heilige Jasagen, the holy affirmation. 
Furthermore, both thinkers share lineages that intersected with each other 
in surprising and remarkable ways. James was, for example, directly in the 
lineage of thought that included his Harvard predecessor Emerson, a thinker 
whom Nietzsche greatly admired. Furthermore, religious experience for James 
methodologically suspends any consideration of doctrinal or institutional 
commitments (always good sources for pestilence), and argues for a sense of 
religion with which we still have not fully come to terms. Religious experience 
is first and foremost experience, not ritual, doctrines, theology, institutions, or 
a philosophy. Experience, feeling, sensation, are all issues with which we are 
still grappling philosophically, precisely because they bring philosophy beyond 
its penchant demonstrations and unambiguous formulations. Religious experi-
ence does not, for example, only name a particular experience, but a variety of 
experiences, rendering “religion” itself a “collective name” (VR, 31). James 
carefully attempts not to lose this complexus of experiences in a hasty and 
false universal. Yet James, ever a good doctor and pragmatist, favors healthy 
experiences that are reborn from melancholy, a deep sickness in which life no 
longer draws us out of ourselves and which therefore “constitutes an essential 
moment in every complete religious evolution” (VR, 28). What is to us that I 
am healthy again? 
Another figure, still today not fully appreciated, also participates in these 
intersecting lineages, namely Schelling. Although a thorough treatment of this 
kinship is best a topic for a further paper, I would to conclude with a couple of 
passing thoughts on this topic. 
Karl Löwith was among the first to insist upon this kinship. “The utter 
lack of madness leads not to reason but to imbecility. The fundamental stuff of 
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all of life and existence is, according to Schelling as well as Nietzsche, the 
awful [das Schreckliche]: a blind power and force, a barbaric principle, that 
can be overcome but never eliminated and which is ‘the foundation of all 
greatness and beauty’.”
11 James’ close friend and colleague, Charles Sanders 
Peirce, informed him a letter that his own philosophy had been most deeply 
influenced by Schelling. “If you were to call my own philosophy Schellingian-
ism transformed in the light of modern physics, I should not take it hard.”
12 
It was in this sense that Schelling maintained that there is no health or sick-
ness per se (as if these were discrete entities) any more so than there is Good or 
Evil per se. Health becomes thinkable as what has been lost in sickness, the lost 
origin concealed within the ataxia of forces that is sickness. “Therefore each 
Wesen can only become revealed in its opposite, love only in hate, unity only in 
strife” (I/7, 373). In this sense, sickness would be the inversion of health within 
health itself. It is not a moving away from health, but rather an ataxia within 
health that turns health against itself. The soul of sickness, the opposite force 
(the ideal and incomprehensible force) concealed within the ataxia of sickness, is 
health, in the same way that Schelling claimed that “the soul of all hate is love” 
(I/7, 401). Health is the indivisible remainder of sickness, the unthinkable soul 
within sickness, just as love is topsy-turvy hate and hate is perverse love. 
Evil, the moral equivalent of sickness, refuses the general economy of 
forces and demands itself. “What causes illness other than a churlishness to-
wards development, other than the individual strength not wanting to con-
tinue with the whole, not wanting to die away with the whole, but obstinately 
wanting to be for itself” (C, 36). 
The model of sickness that operates in Schelling’s philosophy is similar to 
the model that Georges Canguilhem articulates in The Normal and the 
Pathological (1943).
13 Sickness has traditionally been construed in one of two 
ways. Either one first has health and endeavors to defend it against the 
barbarism of illness – “Disease enters and leaves man as through a door” (NP, 
39) – or, as did the Greeks, one assumes that pathology indicates that the 
body is out of balance and must be returned to its equilibrium (NP, 40). Both 
approaches assume that the pathological opposes the normal just as sickness 
opposes health. Both accounts presuppose that we know what it means to be 
healthy, that there is some idea that adequately circumscribes the body’s 
flourishing. For Canguilhem one does not begin knowing what it means to be 
healthy and hence assume that healing is the war against the looming threat 
                             
11   Karl Löwith, Nietzsches Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen (1935), fourth proofed 
edition based on the corrected third edition, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1986), 154. 
12   Quoted in R. B. Perry, The Thought and Character of William James (Boston: Little Brown, 1935), II: 
416. See also Bruce Matthews’ introduction to his translation of Schelling’s inaugural Berlin lec-
tures, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 74-
75. 
13   Georges Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological, trans. Carolyn Fawcett and Robert Cohen 
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of sickness. One does not first have health. Health is not a discernible set of 
functions. A healthy person is not someone who meets the formal criteria for 
being in good working order. We are first fallen from health, always thinking it 
in arrears, and hence pathology is not anti-life, but rather “another way of life” 
(NP, 89). “Diseases are new ways of life” (NP, 100) that a posteriori reveal more 
of the body’s heretofore inhibited possibilities. “Disease reveals normal 
functions to us at the precise moment when it deprives us of their exercise” 
(NP, 101). Nietzsche himself in a Nachlaß fragment claimed that “health and 
sickness are not essentially different things, like the old doctors and a few 
practitioners still believe today” (III, 781). 
Hans Georg Gadamer, who mounted towards the end of his life one of the 
great defenses of the art of healing, of the Heilmittel, called the revelatory 
movement of sickness, that is to say, that health continually announces itself 
by what it is not, and therefore as something always still to come, as a site 
futurity and natality, die Verborgenheit der Gesundheit, the mysterious hidde-
ness of health. 
Without doubt it is part of our nature as living beings that our conscious self-
awareness remains largely in the background so that our enjoyment of good 
health is constantly concealed from us. Yet despite its hidden character health 
none the less manifests itself in a general feeling of well-being. It shows itself 
above all where such a feeling of well-being means that we are open to new 
things, ready to embark on new enterprises and, forgetful of ourselves, scarcely 
notice the demands and strains which are put on us. This is what health is. It 
does not consist in an increasing concern for every fluctuation in one’s general 
physical condition or the eager consumption of prophylactic medicines.
14 
One can already hear the anticipation of the mysterious hiddeness of the 
great health and its transformative emergence: 
It may come gradually, or it may occur abruptly; it may come through altered feel-
ings, or through altered powers of action; or it may come through new intellectual 
insights, or through [mystical] experiences . . . However it come, it brings a char-
acteristic sort of relief; . . . it often transforms the most intolerable misery into the 
profoundest and most enduring happiness. (VR, 195) 
Finally, in what radical, post-doctrinal sense can a saint be Nietzschean 
and can Nietzsche be in some delicate and unexpected way, saintly?
15 This 
depends, I think, on how we understand the health of philosophy itself. 
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Enlightenment rationalism.” After Christianity, trans. Luca D’Isanto (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2002), 86-87. 